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Sunrise Toyota court distinguished Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 35
wherein the Court of Appeals unanimously held that the German
parent was not subject to New York jurisdiction on the basis of its
,subsidiary's activities on either an agency or department theory. In
Delagi, the American Volkswagen distributor was a publicly-owned
franchise whose only significant contact with the German manufacturer
was through its purchase of cars at dockside from the American importer, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the manufacturer, which was not
doing business here. In denying jurisdiction, the Court stated that
"[w]here, as here, there exists [sic] truly separate corporate entities,
not commonly owned, a valid inference of agency cannot be sustained."6
The instant court's characterization of the relationship between
the Japanese parents and their American subsidiaries as one of agency
is in accord with Frummer and Delagi. Moreover, it fairly places
responsibility on the nondomiciliary parents to defend litigation stemming from the purposeful use of the state by their subsidiaries which
they planned and at least partially controlled.
CPLR 305(b): Court is powerless to enter default judgment where
notice served with summons fails to state object of action.
87
Although an action is commenced by the service of a summons,
a judgment may not be entered against a defaulting defendant unless
service of either a complaint or a CPLR 305(b) or 316(a) notice is also
proved. 8 In the absence of such proof, a court is without jurisdiction
to enter a default judgment. 9 When a plaintiff attempts to serve a
summons and notice pursuant to CPLR 305(b), but his notice fails
to meet the statutory requirements, what are the jurisdictional consequences?
In Arden v. Loew's Hotels, Inc.,40 the plaintiff commenced a personal injury action by service of a summons containing a notice stating
the amount of damages sought, but not the nature of the claim. The
notice was, therefore, defective in that, while it set forth the relief
sought, it failed to state the object of the action as required by CPLR
305(b). 41 Finding that the defendant was aware of the nature and the
35 29 N.Y.2d 426, 278 N.E.2d 895, 328 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1972).

SO Id. at 431, 278 N.E.2d at 897, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 656.

37 CPLR 304.
38 CPLR 3215(e).
3
9 See McDeimott v. Hoenig, 32 App. Div. 2d 838, 302 N.Y.S.2d 280 (2d Dep't 1968)
(mer.); Malone v. Citarella, 7 App. Div. 2d 871, 182 N.Y.S.2d 200 (2d Dep't 1959) (mem.).
40 40 App. Div. 2d 894, 337 N.Y.S.2d 669 (3d Dep't 1972) (mem.).
41 CPLR 305(b) provides in pertinent part:
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object of the action when the summons was served, the Supreme Court,
Tompkins County, entered a default judgment after an inquest, the
defendant having failed to appear.4 2 On appeal, the Appellate Division,
Second Department, reversed the lower court's order and vacated the
judgment, holding that the defect in the notice was jurisdictional. 3
The dissent reasoned that since a notice was given pursuant to CPLR
305(b) and the defendant was advised of the assertion of a serious
claim, the court had power to enter the default judgment.4
The Arden holding implies that a defective CPLR 305(b) notice
is equivalent to no notice at all, the defect rendering a court powerless to enter a default judgment. This decision requires one who seeks
the benefits of CPLR 805(b) to comply fully with its provisions, thereby affording the fullest protection to the absent party. The practitioner
can avoid this jurisdictional pitfall by including a statement of the
object of the action when serving a 305(b) notice.
CPLR 308(5): Defendants attempt to evade service of process by
deception held ineffective.
CPLR 308(5) empowers a court to devise extraordinary methods
of service of process when the regular methods are impracticable. 45 Such
impracticability may result when a defendant intentionally evades the
process server. In Kenworthy v. Van Zandt,46 the defendant, by false
assurances of his availability, induced the plaintiff's attorney to delay
service of process for three days. In the interim, the defendant vacated
his New York apartment and established a new domicile in Tennessee.
Upon discovering the ruse, the plaintiff's attorney effected service by
delivering the summons and complaint to the superintendent of the
apartment building where the defendant had resided and by mailing a
[The summons may contain or have attached thereto a notice stating the object
of the action and the relief sought, and, in an action for a sum certain or for a
sum which can by computation be made certain, the sum of money for which
judgment will be taken in case of default.
Note that the statute appears to require a statement of the object of the action in cases
involving liquidated damages as well as in other actions.
42The clerk may enter a default judgment under CPLR 3215 only when the summons and notice were for a liquidated claim. When unliquidated damages are sought,
a plaintiff who has served an object notice may obtain a default judgment by applying
to the court and obtaining an inquest. See 1 WK&M
305.12.
43 40 App. Div. 2d at 895, 837 N.Y.S.2d at 671, citing McDermott v. Hoenig, 32 App.
Div. 2d 838, 302 N.Y.S.2d 280 (2d Dep't 1968) (mem.).
4440 App. Div. 2d at 895, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 671.
45 The court's discretion under CPLR 308(5) is limited only by the requirements of
due process. The method of service devised must be reasonably calculated to give the
defendant notice of the action and an opportunity to be heard. Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457 (1940).
46 71 Misc. 2d 950, 337 N.Y.S.2d 481 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1972).

